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Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Sweden

Introduction

As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on: "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

Sweden would hereby like to submit her report to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2002, Sweden has actively participated in the work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This has been done, for example, through the European Union, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, and through the Five Ambassadors' initiative in the Conference on Disarmament.

Disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone in Swedish foreign policy and Sweden is a staunch supporter of efforts aimed at advancing progress in this field. In a newspaper article on 27 January 2004, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Ms. Laila Freivalds, together with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Finland, Mr. Giorgios Papandreou and Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, gave their views on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and on the NPT. They urged the three states currently outside the NPT regime – India, Israel and Pakistan - to unconditionally join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon state as soon as possible. They also called for the implementation of the

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13 practical steps agreed by all NPT states in 2000, including the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. They argued that particular attention should be devoted to the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and voiced concern with the possible development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, and with any plans to increase the role of nuclear weapons in military planning. The ministers furthermore emphasised the importance of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In an address given at the Conference on Disarmament on 16 February 2004, Foreign Minister Freivalds reiterated the vital importance of the IAEA Additional Protocols as they provide the IAEA with the necessary enhanced means and authority to verify that states comply with their non-proliferation commitments. She also expressed regret at the continued deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the 58th UN General Assembly, Sweden, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, presented two resolutions entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (58/51) and "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons" (58/50). The first resolution emphasised, among other things, the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and the implementation of the 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. The second resolution highlighted the need for progress with regard to reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Both resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly.

Sweden supported, at the 58th UNGA, a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, for instance the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (58/34), on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (58/68), on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (58/518), on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (58/49), on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (58/30), on the Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (58/31) and on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (58/46).

Sweden has also been active in trying to strengthen the common policy of the European Union in order to better address the threats posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and more actively pursue disarmament and non-proliferation of these weapons. The EU Heads of State and Government adopted in December 2003 a strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Sweden is committed to its effective implementation.

To further address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction the Swedish government has established an independent international Commission on these weapons. The Commission will present its report, including recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation measures, to the Swedish Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations by 2005/2006.

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Sweden ratified the CTBT on 2 December 1998. Sweden has worked for the early entry into force of the Treaty bilaterally and through the European Union. Sweden has continuously supported the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. Sweden has promoted signatures and ratifications of the Treaty through demarches made by the European Union to a number of states. Sweden supported the resolution (58/71) entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty" adopted by the 58th United Nations General Assembly, which called for measures to enable the Treaty to enter into force. Sweden supports the Article XIV Conferences as important instruments contributing to the early entry into force of the CTBT. Sweden welcomes the results of the third Article XIV Conference in September 2003 and supports the adoption of the final declaration on the twelve specific and practical measures to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty

Sweden has continuously supported the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions by the nuclear weapon states a pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Co-ordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

It is of great concern to Sweden that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on a programme of work since 1998 and, as a consequence, that negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices have not yet commenced. Sweden believes that it is of paramount importance that the members of the CD agree on a programme of work as soon as possible. Sweden has actively participated in conferences, workshops and seminars on the FMCT-issue, as well as on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Sweden will participate actively in the informal meetings of the CD in the spring of 2004 on, among other subjects, nuclear disarmament, FMCT and PAROS. Sweden supported the decision (58/57) on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which was adopted by the 58th United Nations General Assembly.

Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the CD an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

Sweden supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament. Pending an agreement on a programme of work, Sweden will participate actively in the informal meetings of the CD in the spring of 2004 on nuclear disarmament, and use these meetings as a starting point for the work on nuclear disarmament in the CD.

Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

Irreversibility is a fundamental principle for nuclear disarmament. Only irreversible reductions can assure that re-deployment of nuclear weapons does not occur. Sweden continues to stress that the principle of irreversibility should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control measures, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to the nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.

Sweden, unilaterally and together with the states in the New Agenda Coalition, continues to press for states to live up to their commitments regarding the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The unequivocal undertaking that the nuclear-weapons states committed themselves to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference is yet to be fulfilled.

Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

Sweden notes the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the abrogation of START II, the withering away of START III, and the conclusion in 2002 of the Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive reductions. The Moscow Treaty represents a positive first step, but the Treaty has to be made verifiable, irreversible and transparent, and should also address non-operational warheads, in order to be an effective nuclear disarmament measure. Reductions in the numbers of deployed warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sweden supports the initiative. It should be applied in the context of disarmament undertakings.

Step 9: Steps by all nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

- Further efforts by the nuclear weapon states to reduce their arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon states with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to press for advancements in their implementation.

In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Against this background, Sweden together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, have presented resolutions on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which were adopted by the 57th and 58th United Nations General Assembly. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sweden together with Austria and Mexico, submitted a working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Sweden together with Austria and the Ukraine will present a second working paper on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden will continue to work on this issue in view of the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI serve as a confidence building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

It is also of particular importance that nuclear weapon states diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed, and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalisations for their use.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Sweden urges those nuclear weapons states that have not yet done so to conclude such arrangements.

Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Sweden takes an active part in the work on disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons. We refer here to the relevant treaties and instruments that deal with these types of weapons.

Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

Sweden believes that reports on the implementation of the article and paragraph mentioned above enhances transparency and builds confidence and therefore should be encouraged. Sweden submitted reports to the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Sweden continues to give strong support to the IAEA and a system of strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements represents the new verification standard for NPT safeguards. Sweden therefore continues to urge all states to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols. Sweden is of the view that the 2005 Review Conference should take the decision that the Additional Protocol is mandatory under article III of the NPT.